



Introducing a distinction between two 
types of critique of democracy, we are 
obliged to explain how we understand 
their meaning.
Hence, by the substantive critique we 
understand such a position, which finds 
in democracy the essential, ‘elementary’ 
evil being not only accidental and adven-
titious attribute, but lying within its very 
nature. This evil of democracy is then 
understood as irremovable and ‘irre-
formable’. Moreover, it is connected with 
the evil side of a human nature as well 
as allows this side to manifest itself and 
‘leaves the field clear for it’. The conse-
quence of this approach is the absolute 
rejection of democracy as the incurably 
corrupted political regime.
Respectively, by the accidental cri-
tique we understand the more optimis-
tic approach, which discerns drawbacks 
of democracy, even serious ones (other-
wise we could not call it a critique at all), 
but which all the same claims that these 
drawbacks are adventitious, accidental, 
contingent and usually resulting from 
the erroneous understanding of democ-
racy or from its defective institutions. 
Therefore, these drawbacks are curable 
by the use of right remedies (modifica-
tions) regarding democracy itself or by 
supplementing democratic institutions 
with counterbalancing undemocratic 
ones (respectively, predemocratic, in his-
torical terms).
From the above distinction it follows 
that:
1) articulations of the view that there 
is any ‘deficit of democracy’ (e.g. what is 
a common practice in the European Un-
ion) or any shortage of civic participation 
resulting with the ‘crisis of democracy’ 
as well as any intertwined convictions 
that ‘the cure for defects of democracy is 
more democracy’ – because they express 
a principally prodemocratic attitude that 
perceives democracy as essentially or per 
se a good thing being confused only be-
cause of some secondary reasons.
2) it is not a priori precluded that 
both kinds of the critique of democracy 
could coexist in the same thinkers or 
political-philosophical stream or posi-
tion. However, such a situation seems 
logically possible only there where we 
f u n d a m e n t a l l y  deal with a substan-
tive critique and where it is the ‘basic 
intention’ of the critic. The presence of 
elements of the substantive critique in 
a thought leaning towards ‘reforming 
democracy’ would lead to shaking or 
doubting in this reformist attitude and in 
consequence would move it to the camp 
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of antidemocrats intrasigeants. There-
fore, their presence in this stream can 
be merely contingent, literally accidental, 
‘scant’ and rather ‘unwitting’.
We also wish to prove the thesis that 
contemporarily in the common view on 
political issues and even in academic po-
litical science there is utterly mistaken 
recognition of positions which the anti-
democrats of both types are situated in. 
It means that as ‘fundamentalist’ en-
emies of democracy are identifi ed only 
these thinkers who actually are only the 
critics of accidental drawbacks of de-
mocracy, particularly opponents of only 
one, though essentially prevailing, type 
of democracy i.e. liberal democracy (or 
conversely, they are enemies of only ple-
beian ochlocracy) – whereas ‘true’, ‘un-
compromising’, in-depth enemies of de-
mocracy (‘substantivists’) are essentially 
unnoticed.
1. Substantive Critiques
The paradigm of the substantive critique 
of democracy was of course created by 
Plato. According to the Greek sage, the 
fundamental feature – nature – of democ-
racy is persistent and incurable lack of 
truth (aletheia). Democracy – as Ryszard 
Legutko1 underlines – by ignoring, not 
knowing it or not wanting to recognise 
the truth, simultaneously perversely 
and irresponsibly ‘exploits’ the truth by 
nonchalantly using the general concepts 
such as virtue, piety, justice, nobleness 
etc. (and their opposites). Their sense 
is determined arbitrarily, depending on 
the hidden interests of persons who use 
these concepts what goes hand in hand 
1 See R. Legutko, Krytyka demokracji w fi lo-
zofi i politycznej Platona, (Cracov, 1991), passim; 
idem, O demokracji starożytnej, [in:] Oblicza demo-
kracji, R. Legutko, J. Kloczkowski (ed.), (Cracov, 
2002), 25–56.
with the absolutisation of partial truths. 
As Plato says, in democracy insolence 
is called good breeding, licence liberty, 
prodigality magnifi cence and shame-
lessness manly spirit2. This manifesta-
tion of arbitrariness renders politics only 
a struggle for domination which in turn 
is served by the sophistic – because not 
focused on the search for truth and even 
deliberately denying its existence and 
possibility of its cognition – kind of rhe-
torical art of persuasion.
In democracy, there is not only the 
rule of deliberate falses (pseudos), but 
also the rule of hullabaloo and gibberish 
of any noncritical ‘whims’, views, opin-
ions and common beliefs (doxai) elevated 
almost to the rank of the superior politi-
cal virtue of democracy and its reason 
for pride (nowadays called ‘pluralism’). 
Hence, although in Plato’s typology of 
political regimes tyranny is even worse 
than democracy, transition from democ-
racy to the regime based on truth seems 
even more diffi cult than in the case of 
tyranny since a tyrant in some circum-
stances can experience an illumination, 
open his eyes to the truth, convert and 
abase himself, whereas democrat’s over-
confi dence in the freedom to express any 
kind of views seems to eliminate this pos-
sibility. Glowing fl amboyance of ‘a gar-
ment of many colors, embroidered with 
all kinds of hues’ or trumperies on a ‘ba-
zaar of constitutions’3, which democracy 
is, poisons a soul by its seeming beauty 
and makes it blasé and indifferent to 
what is ‘closer to the Being’ and what re-
quires an effort to overcome many steep 
slopes. The road to Eleusis from Pireus 
is only geographically shorter than from 
despotically ruled Syracuse.
2 Plato, Republic, 560 E, trans. P. Shorey, Ac-
cessed December 12, 2014. http://www.perseus.
tufts.edu/hopper/.
3 Ibidem, 557 C, D.
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Democracy, according to Plato, is es-
pecially the anthropological mistake, be-
cause it refl ects a disorder in democratic 
state’s citizen soul (a ‘sophistic type of 
man’). In a democratic soul, the proper 
hierarchy of its powers is annulled and 
conversed: a reason does not rule via 
courage over appetites, but higher pow-
ers are subordinate to appetites and in-
dividual preferences. Plato depicts full 
of irony an image of a democratic man 
who to admonitions ‘that some pleasures 
arise from honorable and good desires, 
and others from those that are base, and 
that we ought to practise and esteem 
the one and control and subdue the oth-
ers’, ‘shakes his head (…) and avers that 
they are all alike and to be equally es-
teemed’4 and in consequence he ‘lives 
out his life in this fashion, day by day 
indulging the appetite of the day, now 
wine-bibbing and abandoning himself to 
the lascivious pleasing of the fl ute and 
again drinking only water and dieting; 
[561 D – B.P.] and at one time exercis-
ing his body, and sometimes idling and 
neglecting all things, and at another time 
seeming to occupy himself with philoso-
phy. And frequently he goes in for poli-
tics and bounces up7and says and does 
whatever enters his head. And if military 
men excite his emulation, thither he 
rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he 
turns5, and there is no order or compul-
4 Today this claim to the equal esteem for 
all kinds of appetites and preferences would, in 
‘postmodern’ vernacular, be called ‘affi rmative to-
lerance’.
5 The element of emulation (envy), noticed 
by Plato, in a wrongly structured and indulging in 
all appetites democratic soul was presented cen-
turies later with incomparable expressiveness by 
Shakespeare in his numerous works. The thing 
in phenomenon called by his investigator, René 
Girard (See idem, The Theatre of Envy: William 
Shakespeare, South Bend 2004, pp. 376), a ‘mi-
metic desire’. A jealous impatience of [people – B.P.] 
standing on the lower ranks of social hierarchy and 
sion in his existence, but he calls this 
life of his the life of pleasure and free-
dom and happiness and [561 E – B.P.] 
cleaves to it to the end.’6 The democratic 
kind of man is nothing more than Rorty’s 
‘liberal ironist’ who uses the pleasures of 
the ‘Being’s lightness’.
Democracy is also an epistemologi-
cal error. It is a system dominated by the 
lowest form of cognition (sensitive cogni-
tion): ejkasija – i.e. thinking by images; 
this system is characteristic for the intel-
lectual slaves chained with the shackles 
to the inner wall of the cave and there-
fore capable to see at most the shadows 
that crawl on it. Democrats, by their own 
fault, do not have an access to the cog-
nition of the true being but at most to 
the refl ections of concrete things – these 
from behind the fi rst μταξυ7, i.e. from the 
light of the fi re burning behind a ram-
part on which ‘jugglers’ (read: sophists) 
show their rhetorical tricks. It means 
that democracy does not have a status 
of ontological reality whatsoever: it ‘is’ 
a non-being. Of course, for Plato none of 
the real political regimes is being; only 
the ideal state has this status. Each of 
the empirically identifi able political re-
aspiring to the higher leads them to descent from 
the way of natural and compatible with the rules 
of promoting at the hierarchy ranks and gives rise 
to the malefi cent intention of rapid and illegitimate 
taking place of superiors. This is how the ‘crisis of 
degree’ arises, in which Ate, the Goddess of disa-
greement, unleashes the ‘hounds of war’ (Julius 
Caesar, act III, scene 1). This topic of competition 
on the background of imitative desire, present in 
almost each Shakespeare’s drama, was the fullest 
articulated in the famous speech of Ulysses on the 
monstrous, leading to the ‘endless jar’ between jus-
tice and injustice, results of disturbing the ‘hierar-
chy ranks’ in Troilus and Cresida (act I, scene 3). 
6 Plato, Republic, 561 C, D, E, trans. P. Sho-
rey, Accessed December 12, 2014. http://www.
perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.
7 See C. J. Olbromski, „Platońskie pojęcie 
μταξυ w fi lozofi i politycznej Erica Voegelina”, in: 
Dziedzictwo greckie we współczesnej fi lozofi i poli-
tycznej, ed. P. Kłoczowski, (Cracow, 2004), 91–106.
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gimes is merely a part of being, although 
gradable. Some of them like monarchy or 
aristocracy are closer to the being, while 
the other are farther away; on this scale 
democracy occupies almost the farthest 
place from the being, right before dicta-
torship, i.e. a place where non-being be-
comes nothingness. In the strict sense, 
democracy is not because it lacks the 
truth, good and beauty. This Platonic de-
ontologisation of democracy is a quintes-
sence of a radically substantive critique 
of democracy.
Actually, there are also threads of 
the accidental critique of democracy in 
Plato, such as the indication of its ‘class’ 
character (‘democracy (…) comes into be-
ing when the poor, winning the victory, 
put to death some of the other party, 
drive out others, and grant the rest of 
the citizens an equal share in both citi-
zenship and offi ces’8), chaos specifi c to it 
or fi nally – presented with humour and 
a satiric exaggeration – the disastrous 
consequences of what in this ‘youth’ 
regime is today called a ‘colourful tol-
erance’ such as an indulgence for the 
youngsters pranks, the lack of respect 
for the elders, running wild by domestic 
animals as well as the behaviour of the 
bitches which conduct themselves like 
their mistresses or the sense of dignity 
that horses and asses gain to such extent 
that they bump into everyone who meets 
them and who does not step aside9. All 
these arguments are however second-
ary coming from the fundamental lack of 
truth, good and beauty. In Plato there is 
no room for ‘improving’ democracy, but 
only for ‘liberating’ oneself from it by re-
placing a democratic element by at least 
elements of any regime standing higher 
8 Plato, Republic, 557 A, trans. P. Shorey, Ac-
cessed December 13, 2014. http://www.perseus.
tufts.edu/hopper/.
9 Ibidem, 563 A – D.
than democracy, even (otherwise poor) 
oligarchy: ‘And sometimes, I suppose, 
the democratic element retires before the 
oligarchical, some of its appetites having 
been destroyed and others expelled, and 
a sense of awe and reverence grows up 
in the young man’s10 soul and order is 
restored.’11
A question of Aristotle’s anti-democ-
ratism is a more complex and ambiguous 
one. There are paragraphs in Aristotle 
which strength and principality are not 
weaker than in Plato’s critique, especial-
ly in the 4th book of Politics, where the 
emphasis is put on the irremovable lack 
of virtue and the rule of law in democra-
cy. Aristotle identifi es democracy as the 
system of uncontrollable voluntarism of 
mob and demagogy in which not laws 
but decrees govern, hence that regime – 
which leads to the complete relaxation of 
polis – does not even deserve to be called 
order, but disorder; ‘for where the laws 
do not govern there is no constitution’12.
On the other hand, in the Aristotle’s 
typology of political regimes – based on 
two juxtaposed criteria: the formal one 
(a question: ‘who rules?’) and the tele-
ological one (‘what is the purpose of rul-
ing?’) – democracy being the ‘tyranny of 
10 It is clear that in this fragment there is 
a polemics with the view of sophist Protagoras 
(known from Plato’s summary in a dialogue titled 
by Protagoras’ name) who in his adage were justify-
ing a prodemocratic option by an argument that 
Zeus equipped a l l  people with ‘respect and right’ 
(Plato, Protagoras, trans. W. R. M. Lamb, 322 C, 
Accessed December 13, 2014 http://www.per-
seus.tufts.edu/hopper/); on the other hand, Plato 
claims that the occurrence of the sense of shame 
in the soul is conditioned by purifying the soul by 
removing a democratic element from it or by its 
(moral) aristocratisation.
11 Plato, Republic, 560 A, trans. P. Shorey, 
Accessed December 13, 2015 http://www.perseus.
tufts.edu/hopper/.
12 Aristotle, Politics, 1292 A, trans. H. Rack-
ham, Accessed January 16, 2015 http://www.per-
seus.tufts.edu/hopper/.
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the mob’ is placed amongst bad regimes 
although not in the last place but as the 
most bearable evil because of power dif-
ferentiation while the worst one is tyr-
anny sensu proprio, i.e. rule of the one 
because power, i.e. a possibility to do 
evil effi ciently, is consolidated there the 
most. Moreover, on the good side of po-
litical regimes exists also – the least good 
– the form of folk government, called po-
liteia, in which people’s will is inferior to 
the general principles of law and serves 
not only to the poorest, but to general 
benefi t. There is also a characteristic Ar-
istotle’s stipulation that democracy in 
a negative sense (lawlessness) is an or-
der of things in which (…) ‘the law ought 
to govern all things, is not a constitution 
at all’13. It proves (or rather confi rms, be-
cause there is plenty of proves in his rea-
soning) that the designate of the term de-
mocracy is in Aristotle extremely shaky: 
in different contexts it can mean (specifi -
cally) the evil kind of rules of the whole, 
(generically) both of their forms (‘evil’ 
democracy and ‘good’ politeia), ruthless 
egalitarianism14, a regime based on (low) 
property qualifi cation, and that what can 
be named ‘moral aristocracy’15, or even 
each lawful regime in which each free 
citizen somehow participates in ruling16.
13 Ibidem.
14 A political regime, in which ‘to the full-
est extent all alike share equally in the govern-
ment’ (Ibidem, 1291 B, Accessed January 16, 2015 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/, called de-
mocracy ‘in a fi rst row’ – ibidem.
15 ‘…all the citizens that are not open to 
challenge1 to have a share in offi ce, but for the law 
to rule’ – (Ibidem, 1292 A, Accessed January 16, 
2015 http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.
16  It is about Aristotle’s (auto)refl ection, who 
claims that the given by him defi nition of citizen – 
as a person who has an access to share in courts 
and people’s assembly – ‘applies especially to citi-
zenship in a democracy; under other forms of gov-
ernment it may hold good, but will not necessar-
ily do so.’ (Ibidem, 1275 B, Accessed January 16, 
2015 http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/, On 
Let’s add that although the possi-
bility of the existence of decent, rightful 
and ‘staid’ democracies seems to contra-
dict Aristotle’s conviction that in a good 
regime ‘a good life education and virtue 
would make the most just claim’17 that 
is impossible to achieve by the ‘majority’ 
(hoi polloi), a suggested solution seems to 
be building not the best regime, because 
it is ‘for many (…) impossible to attain’18, 
but a regime that would be the ‘best un-
der assumed conditions’19 – i.e. a regime 
arising from a mix of the good features of 
aristocracy and politeia.
Therefore, it seems that in Aristotle 
the elements of substantive and acciden-
tal critiques remain in the state of rela-
tive equilibrium and thereby also of in-
decisiveness. One can say that Aristotle 
leans towards the substantive critique 
as far as he remains Plato’s follower and 
towards the accidental one as far as he 
formulates a view that expresses his own 
attitude and a specifi c to him quest for 
a middle road, a ‘Golden Means’. Any-
way, Aristotle’s ambiguity or even hesi-
tancy causes that both antidemocrats 
intrasingeants and the authors of the 
projects of ‘refi nement’, ‘aristocratisa-
tion’ or ‘republicanisation’ of democracy 
use his arguments20.
the other hand, the ‘defi nition of a citizen admits of 
correction’ – ibidem.
17 Ibidem, 1283 A, Accessed January 16, 
2015 http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.
18 Ibidem, 1288 B, Accessed January 16, 
2015 http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.
19 Ibidem.
20 See especially: P. Viereck, Conservatism Re-
visited: The Revolt Against The Revolt, 1815–1845, 
(New York 1949) passim; J. Maritain, Człowiek 
i państwo [1951], trans. A. Grobler, (Cracov 1993) 
116–153; Y. R. Simon, Filozofi a rządu demokratycz-
nego [1951], trans. R. Legutko, (Cracov 1993), pas-
sim; J. H. Hallowell, Moralne podstawy demokracji 
[1954], trans. J. Marcinkowski, (Warsaw 1995), 
68–123; Th. L. Pangle, Uszlachetnianie demokracji. 
Wyzwanie epoki postmodernistycznej [1992], trans. 
M. Klimowicz, (Cracov 1994), passim.
16
The identifi cation of the later con-
tinuers – even until our times – of the 
substantive critique of democracy, par-
ticularly in a ‘neo-Platonic’ stream, is not 
a diffi cult thing to do; above all they are:
1) the contemporary political philos-
ophers referring directly to the classical 
tradition and trying to renew it like Eric 
Voegelin, who adds to the Platonic cri-
tique sensu proprio the argument about 
a gnostic ‘confusion’ of the democratic 
mind that affl icts democracy (liberal, 
i.e. ‘gnostic right’) solely to a smaller ex-
tent than it affl icts revolutionary social-
ism and communism (‘gnostic left’)21, 
or like Leo Strauss who underlines the 
inability of democracy to resolve, un-
til now, the problem of education un-
derstood as the formation of character 
(resp. the ‘royal education’) and, in con-
sequence, the inability of fi nding a de-
fence against ‘crawling conformism’22; 
2) the representatives of the political 
philosophy of reactive, traditionalis-
tic conservatism, like Joseph de Mais-
tre23, Louis de Bonald24 or Juan Donoso
21 See E. Voegelin, “The New Science of Poli-
tics”, in The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin. Moder-
nity Without Restraint, ed. M. Henningsen, Vol. 5,
(Missouri 2000), 175–220 (or Polish version:
E. Voegelin, Nowa nauka polityki [1952], trans.
P. Śpiewak, (Warsaw 1992), 158–162).
22 L. Strauss, “What Is Political Philosophy? 
And Other Studies”, (Chicago 1988), p. 9–55 (or 
Polish version: L. Strauss, Czym jest fi lozofi a poli-
tyki? [1958], in idem, Sokratejskie pytania. Eseje 
wybrane, trans. P. Maciejko, (Warsaw 1958), 89).
23 In his opinion democracy can be defi ned 
simply as ‘an association of men without sovereign-
ty’ – J. de Maistre, Study on Sovereignty, http://
maistre.uni.cx:8000/sovereignty.html, trans. Jack 
Lively, Online access: 1.04.2015; and, in general, 
democratic forma regiminis that is a ‘transitory me-
teor, whose brilliance excludes duration’ – ibidem.
24 For whom democracy is identical with 
a religious negation, i.e. atheism: ‘Democracy fu-
riously casts out from political society all visible 
unity and focus of power; it sees the sovereign only 
in the subjects, or the people: just as atheism re-
jects the original and prime cause of the universe, 
and sees it only in its effects, in matter. In the sys-
Cortés25, Spanish carlists (like Victor 
Pradera, for whom democracy is an onto-
logical impossibility26), national royalists 
from Action Française, headed by Charles 
Maurras, for whom the democratic ‘reign 
of number’ is a contradiction of the whole 
Platonic trinity: the truth, good and 
beauty27; fi nally so-called ‘integral’ tradi-
tionalists (René Guénon, Julius Evola), 
according to whom democracy is one of 
the least stages of the traditional hierar-
chic civilization’s fall in the long process 
of the egalitarian revolt of any ‘inferiori-
ty’28. On the other hand, the appropri-
ate to this matter Aristotle’s ambiguity is 
expressed by the representatives of mod-
erate evolutionist conservatism, starting 
from Edmund Burke. In the opinion of 
the English thinker ‘perfect democracy’ 
is in fact ‘the most shameless thing in 
tem of the latter, matter has done everything; in 
the system of the former, the people have the right 
to do everything.’ – Œuvres de M. de Bonald, (Paris 
1819), 128, so ‘in fact, one might call the demo-
crats the atheists of politics’ – ibidem.
25 In his opinion democratic ideals are con-
taminated by evil in their very (rebellious) nature, 
because they are ‘opposition’s, not government’s, 
ideals […], fruitless ideals, barren ideals, which 
should be fought back until their burial…’ – [This 
is my own translation based on J. Donoso Cortés, 
O dyktaturze [1849], trans. N. Łuczyńska, W. Pr-
zybylski, “Res Publica Nowa” 2007, Nr 1(191), 150. 
The original source was not available. – B.P.]
26 ‘…democracy is not a political system, nei-
ther perfect nor less perfect. In the political order 
democracy IS NOT. […] Democracy is nonentity.’ – 
V. Pradera, El Estado Nuevo, (Madrid 1941), 126.
27 ‘Democracy is the greatest error of the 
past century, the enemy of culture and productiv-
ity both.’ – Ch. Maurras, Dictionnaire politique et 
critique, (Paris 1934), Vol. IV, 401.
28 ‘Liberalism, then democracy, then social-
ism, than radicalism, fi nally communism and Bol-
shevism have historically appeared only as degrees 
of the same evil, as stages that prepare each one 
that follows in the complex of a process of decline.’– 
J. Evola, Orientations [1950], trans. Anonymous, 
Accessed April 1, 2015 http://www.gornahoor.
net/?p=4541, (Polish version: J. Evola, Orientacje 
[1950], trans. B. Kozieł, (Chorzów 1993), 11.
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the world’29; he also does not hesitate to 
claim that ‘the state suffers oppression’ 
if is ‘permitted to rule’ by ‘hair-dresser 
or a working tallow-chandler’30 he notes 
however that he does not condemn any 
policy in advance, ‘by referring to the ab-
stract rules’ and that he allows the situ-
ations in which the democratic form can 
become a necessity or even be desired 
in specifi c, but very rare circumstances. 
Eventually, however, by referring directly 
to Aristotle, he agrees with the opinion of 
the ancients (antidemocrats) that ‘an ab-
solute democracy (…) is [hard – B.P.] to 
be reckoned among the legitimate forms 
of government’ and that democracy 
should be recognised ‘rather [as – B.P.] 
the corruption and degeneracy, than 
the sound constitution of a republic’31.
3) On the same ground were standing 
the traditional political theology of the 
Catholic Church, treating the democrat-
ic claim to people’s sovereignty as the 
‘political atheism’ and as the antropothe-
istic heresy towards the rule of transcen-
dental power derivation (per Me regnant 
reges; non est potestas nisi a Deo). In 
a confrontation with the Revolution, pro-
claiming this usurpation of authority, 
Magisterium has confi rmed its rejection 
for many times, with the greatest power 
in the Mirari vos encyclical written by the 
adamant defender of monarchical legiti-
mism, Pope Gregor XVI: ‘We have learned 
that certain teachings are being spread 
among the common people in writings 
which attack the trust and submission 
due to princes; the torches of treason are 
being lit everywhere. Care must be taken 
lest the people, being deceived, are led
29 E. Burke, Refl ections on the Revolution 




away from the straight path. (…) There-
fore both divine and human laws cry out 
against those who strive by treason and 
sedition to drive the people from confi -
dence in their princes and force them 
from their government.’32 Still in the en-
cyclical ‘about the godless communism’ 
Pope Pius XI was recalling that the error 
of socio-political egalitarianism was pav-
ing the way for the economic egalitarian-
ism of socialism, so: ‘It is not true that 
all have equal rights in civil society. It is 
not true that there exists no lawful so-
cial hierarchy.’33 However, yet in the (ex-
ceptionally rich in content and quantity) 
teaching of Pope Leon XIII, there was out-
lined the shadow of the dualistic break 
between the very strong condemnation 
of the very rule of people’s sovereignty34 
and the exceedingly ‘soft’ practical posi-
tion towards republic and democracy35, 
as the permissible structural ‘hypoth-
esis’, conditioned utterly (similarly as in 
the teaching of Pius XII36) by recognising 
a dependence to the God’s law, worship-
32 Mirari Vos, On Liberalism And Religious 
Indifferentism, Encyclical Of Pope Gregory XVI, Au-
gust 15, 1832 http://www.papalencyclicals.net/
Greg16/g16mirar.htm (Polish version: Encyklika 
Ojca św. Grzegorza XVI, Mirari vos O liberalizmie 
[15 VIII 1832], (Warsaw 2003), 16.)
33 Divini Redemptoris, Encyclical Of Pope 
Pius Xi On Atheistic Communism, 19 III 1937, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encycli-
cals/
34 Especially in encyclicals: on political pow-
er (Diuturnum illud, 29 VI 1881) and on Christian 
state (Immortale Dei, 1 XI 1885).
35 In the encyclical Au milieu des sollicitudes
(16 II 1892), striking especially to French royalists, calling 
to ‘joining’ (ralliement) the Republic, and also in inconsid-
erate using the term ‘Christian democracy’ in the encyclical 
Rerum novarum (15 V 1891), which later demanded magiste-
rial auto-correction delegitimising giving to this term politico-
constitutional meaning in the encyclical Graves de communi 
(18 I 1901).
36 Radio speech broadcasted on Christmas 
Day in 1944; see J. Madiran, Demokracja według 
Piusa XII, trans. M. Loba, ‘Sprawa Polska’ 1992, 
10, 16–18.
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ping the public cult of the real God and 
respecting the natural civic hierarchy37.
2. Accidental Critiques
The accidental critiques of democracy 
can be found mainly in the thinkers be-
ing concerned with cacistocracy (the 
‘reign of the worst’) anyhow inseparable 
from modern mass democracy (‘numeric’, 
‘numbercration’) but certainly accepting 
that democratisation is an inevitable and 
irreversible process and, moreover, being 
convinced that there are some weighty 
political or even moral reasons stand-
ing in the defense of democracy. These 
are conservative liberals (relatively lib-
eral conservatives), being the inheritors 
of classical aristocratic liberalism, e.g. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, lord Acton, Johann 
J. Bachofen38, Jacob Ch. Burckhardt, 
Benedetto Croce, Guido De Ruggiero, 
Gulielmo Ferrero, Émile Faguet, Ber-
trand de Jouvenel, José Ortega y Gas-
set, Florian Znaniecki or Friedrich A. von 
Hayek.
The characteristic for this stream is 
a chasm between the clarity of the cri-
tique of the ‘democratic Leviathan’ in ac-
tion (usually not giving a way to the reac-
tionists) and the restraint in formulating 
remedial postulates. On the downsides 
of democracy liberals watch basically 
only from the one point of view: a threat 
to the individual liberty39. For the clas-
37 More on the topic of the evolution of the 
relation of the contemporary Pope’s teaching to 
democracy I write in two articles: Katolicka teolo-
gia polityczna w XX wieku, ‘Christianitas’ 2002, 
Nr 13, p. 109–143 and Niefortunny konkubi-
nat. Historia wzajemnych relacji konserwatyzmu 
i chrześcijańskiej demokracji, zwięźle opowiedzi-
ana, ‘Pro Fide Rege et Lege’ 2006, 3–4(56), 17–24.
38 The author of famous aphorism being 
a quintessence of this version of anti-democratism: 
‘It is because I love freedom that I hate democracy.’
39 I write more about this in the article Aporie 
demokracji liberalnej (w świetle poglądów liberalnej 
sically liberal way of thinking about de-
mocracy is the quintessential position 
taken by lord Acton, who – discussing 
on sir Thomas Erskine May’s work about 
democracy in Europe – was concluding: 
‘democracy, like monarchy, is salutary 
within limits and fatal in excess; that it 
is the truest friend of freedom or its most 
unrelenting foe, according as it is mixed 
or pure’40. Taking to account that, ac-
cording to Acton, the condition of liberty 
is the existence of power distribution and 
that in democracy he saw a way towards 
power concentration, he desired to wear 
a brake to this dangerously ‘increasing 
democracy’ in the form of ‘constrained 
federalism’ being, in his opinion, ‘essen-
tial security for freedom in every genuine 
democracy’41.
The liberal distrust towards a state, 
not so weakening in the time of its de-
mocratisation, but strengthening be-
cause (what was clearly explicated by 
Burckhardt) along with the emergence 
of the ideal of people’s sovereignty and 
the common equality of rights a state 
becomes ‘subjected to the most powerful 
action of thought, of philosophical ab-
straction’42 and even more because ‘there 
is a threat of the complete blur of bor-
ders between state’s and society’s tasks’ 
of which the extreme point is a stream 
called libertarianism (Ludwig von Mises, 
Murray N. Rothbard, Robert A. Nozick). 
prawicy), submitted to a post-conference book en-
titled „Dylematy współczesnego liberalizmu” (Wyż-
sza Szkoła Gospodarki w Bydgoszczy).
40 Lord Acton, “Sir Erskine May’s Democracy 
in Europe”, in Lord Acton, The History of Freedom 
And Other Essays, Project Gutenberg Ebook 2010, 
63, Accessed February 23, 2015: http://www.
gutenberg.org/fi les.
41 Ibidem, 98.
42 J. Burckhardt, Refl ections on History, 
trans. M. D. H., (London 1950), 114 (Polish version: 
J. Burckhardt, Państwo w dziejach powszechnych 
[1905], trans. W. Buchner, ‘Przegląd Polityczny’ 
1994, Nr 25, VII.).
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For the issue considered in this article, 
particularly interesting fact is that in the 
newest phase of social philosophy, guid-
ed by Hans-Hermann Hoppe, hitherto 
stipulations less or more boldly formu-
lated towards democracy gave way to its 
fi rm stigmatisation as such regime that 
without hesitation is indicated as the 
worst one from three kinds of social order 
outlined by this author (except democra-
cy – monarchy43 and ‘natural order’ also 
called ‘ordered anarchy’, ‘anarchocapi-
talism’, ‘selfgovernance’, ‘private law so-
ciety’ or ‘pure capitalism’44). Democracy 
here is openly delegitimised (‘Above all, 
the idea of democracy and majority rule 
must be de1egitimized.’45), what could 
make us think that we almost deal with 
the substantive critique of democracy, 
from what keeps us a circumstance that 
the evil of democracy is consequently 
connected with only one feature of this 
regime, indicated by Hoppe and being 
for him the measure of good and evil, i.e. 
a depreciation of private property: ‘eve-
43 Hoppe underlines that in his work he pre-
sents a ‘defi nitely favourable’ interpretation of (tra-
ditional) hereditary monarchy, which he places sig-
nifi cantly higher than democracy because he fi nds 
monarchical power as private government (private-
ly-owned-government), ‘which in turn is explained 
as promoting future-orientedness and a concern 
for capital values and economic calculation by the 
government ruler’, while he fi nds ‘democratic gov-
ernment (…) as publicly-owned government, which 
is explained as leading to present-orientedness and 
a disregard or neglect of capital values in govern-
ment rulers’. – H.-H. Hoppe, Democracy. The God 
That Failed, New Jersey 2001, p. XIX. Obviously, 
Hoppe is not a monarchist because of two reasons: 
1) he fi nds that a return to ancient regime is impos-
sible because ‘the legitimacy of monarchical rule 
appears to have been irretrievably lost’ (ibidem, 71) 
and 2) in his eyes ‘ordered anarchy’, i.e. a social 
system free of monopoly and taxation is higher 
than any else; however, the author puts a lot of en-
ergy to demonstrate that the historical leave from 
monarchy for democracy was a ‘civilizational de-
cline’ (ibidem, p. XXI).
44 Ibidem, XXI.
45 Ibidem, 70.
ryone may openly covet everyone else’s 
property, as long as he appeals to de-
mocracy’46. ‘Under democracy everyone 
becomes a threat’47; in the author’s opin-
ion democracy is merely a ‘gentle form of 
communism’48.
Hoppe’s antidemocratic radicalism 
is, however, an exception in the liberal 
stream of criticism towards democracy. 
The conservative liberals usually, with 
passion that does not yield to perspicac-
ity, point out the negative consequences 
of social and especially cultural democ-
ratisation, they are, however, much more 
cautious when they approach the matter 
of political regime. Palliatives suggested 
by them in this matter (to mention at 
least modest and fragmentary proposals 
of Italian liberals: De Ruggiero, Ferrero or 
even Hayek’s well-constructed concept of 
demarchy49) usually have a nature of mi-
nor corrections towards a democratic re-
gime, being capable to (rather intention-
ally than actually) merely level the work 
of mobius democraticus. The conceptual 
niche that allows the liberal opponents 
of democracy to avoid a frontal confron-
tation with it is a traditional distinction 
between democracy and ochlocracy, i.e. 




49 See G. De Ruggiero, The History of Euro-
pean Liberalism, trans. R. G. Collingwood, (London 
1927), pp. xi + 476 (Polish version: G. De Ruggiero, 
Historia liberalizmu europejskiego [1925], trans.
A. Adeo, in B. Sobolewska, M. Sobolewski, Myśl 
polityczna XIX i XX wieku. Liberalizm, (Warsaw 
1978), 538); G. Ferrero, Between the Old World and 
the New, trans. A. C. Curtis, New York 1914 (Pol-
ish version: G. Ferrero, Między przeszłością a tem 
co nas czeka, trans. J. Kuryłowicz, (Poznań 1927), 
11); Idem, Jedność świata, trans. S. Dembiński, 
(Warszawa 1929), 74; F. A. von Hayek, Law, Le-
gislation and Liberty Vol III The Political Order of 
a Free People, (Chicago 1979), passim.
50 See F. Znaniecki, Upadek cywilizacji za-
chodniej. Szkice z pogranicza fi lozofi i kultury i so-
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lieu and terminology and following J. L. 
Talmon51 between liberal democracy and 
totalitarian democracy); in both cases the 
designates of pejoratively featured terms 
are always connected with radical social 
and economic egalitarianism, revolution-
ary ideologies and the systems of jaco-
binism, bolshevism and often fascism or 
Nazism.
We are going to consider certainly 
the most controversial or maybe even de-
moralising thesis for the acolytes of de-
mocracy; we will try, however, to defend 
a view that merely accidental nature has 
the critique of democracy raised by the 
hardest stigmatised and presented as 
the most serious ‘threat’ (incidentally: in 
the least extent from the side of usually 
indulgently treated Marxism) to democ-
racy, ideologies and totalitarian systems: 
revolutionary socialism (communism, 
bolshevism), fascism and national so-
cialism.
At fi rst, let’s remind that all of these 
ideologies and systems are in their gen-
esis and essence plebeian, massive, col-
lectivist, based on the mobilisation of 
masses, undoubtedly antitraditionalis-
tic. For all of them the ‘founding myth’, 
the beginning of their ‘historical mem-
ory’, is the revolution from 178952 and 
cjologii, Poznań 1921, passim; W. Bernacki, Rządy 
motłochu, czyli zerwanie więzów z bestii ludzkiej, 
‘Nowe Państwo’ 1999, Nr 24 (185).
51 See J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitar-
ian Democracy, (London 1952), passim.
52 If some had doubts that it also affects fas-
cism, it is only to remind a fi rm statement of its 
founder: ‘The Fascist negation of socialism, democ-
racy, liberalism, should not, however, be interpret-
ed as implying a desire to drive the world back-
wards to positions occupied prior to 1789, a year 
commonly referred to as that which opened the 
demo-liberal century. History does not travel back-
wards. The Fascist doctrine has not taken De Mais-
tre as its prophet. Monarchical absolutism is of 
the past, and so is ecclesiolatry. Dead and done 
for are feudal privileges and the division of society 
into closed, uncommunicating castes.’ – B. Mus-
the ‘mob’ symbol (ambiguous by itself53) 
which for them is a ‘sacral’ term. They all 
verbally accept the rule of people’s sov-
ereignty. In all of them, the critique of 
‘real’ democracy (formal, parliamentary, 
pluralistic, multiparty, liberal) is based 
on pointing out its ‘falsehood’, a discrep-
ancy between (acceptable) theory and 
practice ‘falsifying’ the will of people. In 
consequence, they are all sui generis the 
‘secular gospels’ of more perfect, more 
true, higher democracy that actually, 
not only declaratively, gives power to the 
people54.
1) In Marxist communism, the above 
contrast has taken, as known, the form 
of demonstrating a chasm between for-
mal, therefore worthless, bourgeois de-
mocracy55 and socialist democracy (resp. 
solini, The Doctrine of Fascism, trans. Anonymous, 
Accessed March 6, 2015 http://www.worldfuture-
fund.org/, (Polish version: B. Mussolini, Doktryna 
faszyzmu [1932], trans. S. Gniadek, P. Sandauer, 
(Lviv 1935), 42–43).
53 See G. Sartori, The Theory of Democracy 
Revisited, (New Jersey 1987), 247 (Polish version: 
G. Sartori, Teoria demokracji [1987], trans. P. Am-
sterdamski, D. Grinberg, (Warsaw 1988), 37–42); 
J. Bartyzel, Demokracja, (Radom 2002), 9–13.
54 The argumentation of a Russian (or rather 
Soviet one, for which he would agree) writer, ir-
ritating for many reasons, Aleksandr Zinovyev, 
who saw the fulfi lment of people’s rule in Stalin-
ism, can be no rid of by a disregard or a ‘moral 
indignation’. In Zinovyev, a massiveness of terror 
(because if more or less one third of mankind was 
in labor camps, also the population of guards, who 
were to some extent participating in power – power 
over life and death!, was, more or less, the same), 
not yet known until now, and egalitarianism (a way 
from the ‘depths of hell’ to the top of power and 
the very same way back were open for everyone all 
the time) was the nature of people’s rule. Probably 
even more ‘natural form’ of authentic folk democra-
cy was expressed by a commonness of the system 
of denunciation and exposure as a spontaneous 
though stimulated from above activity of masses. 
In a paradoxical way Zinovyev’s analyses coincide 
with a statement of Polish conservatist that ‘bol-
shevism is democracy brought to the absurd’ –
M. Zdziechowski, Europa, Rosja, Azja. Szkice poli-
tyczno-literackie, (Vilnius 1923), 199.
55 But otherwise, treated by Marx himself 
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‘proletarian’56) which will provide real 
power for the people by abolishing the al-
ienating forms of exploitation connected 
with the private possession of production 
means; it will provide the material equal-
ity – economic, social and also cultural 
democracy – an equal access to cultural 
goods or even to commonness in their 
creation. For bolshevist praxis, directed 
on the conquest of the bourgeois state 
and introducing the proletarian dictator-
ship, the probably bigger meaning from 
the above distinction had only Lenin’s 
category of revolutionary democracy, 
which signifi cance, according to Lenin, 
is based on that ‘that to be a democrat 
means reckoning in reality with the in-
terests of the majority of the people and 
not the minority, and that to be a revo-
lutionary means destroying everything 
harmful and obsolete in the most reso-
lute and ruthless manner’57. Therefore, 
on the ruins of the landed-capitalistic 
state there is a revolutionary-democrat-
– and after him by so called orthodox Marxists – 
socialdemocrats like Karl Kautsky or Rosa Luxem-
burg, hence antagonised to bolshevists proclaim-
ing a possibility and a purposefulness of ‘jumping’ 
between phases of transitioning to socialist and 
communist social formation – as a necessary tran-
sition phase to the higher form of democracy.
56 After the Second World War, when revolu-
tion was implanted to countries liberated by the 
Red Army and less ‘advanced’ in building socialism, 
the dictionary of prevailing ideology was enriched 
by a pleonasm people’s democracy as a form that is 
lower that socialist democracy but adequate to the 
state of ‘backwardness’ of these states, expressing 
itself mainly by remnants of individual property. 
As known, an important element of competition 
between particular ‘Eastern blocs’ for a place in 
the hierarchy of vassal states towards USSR, and 
simultaneously an important quasi theoretical 
problem for socialist ‘science’, was agitating the is-
sue whether a given country already ‘achieved’ the 
phase of socialist democracy or it still remains in 
the rearguard of people’s democracy.
57 V. I. Lenin, The Impending Catastrophe 
and How to Combat It. Nationalisation of the Banks, 
trans. Anonymous, Accessed March 7, 2015 htt-
ps://www.marxists.org/archive/.
ic state to rise, i.e. the state in which ‘the 
resistance of the capitalists have disap-
peared, when there are no classes (i.e., 
when there is no distinction between the 
members of society as regards their rela-
tion to the social means of production). 
Only then will a truly complete democra-
cy become possible and be realized, a de-
mocracy without any exceptions whatev-
er’58. A liberal (leftist, as he underlines), 
Andrzej Walicki, who is disturbed by the 
‘neorevolutionary’ extravagance of the 
contemporary exhumer of Lenin – Sla-
voj Žižek – reminds that ‘the essence of 
Lenin’s programme was a ‘jump into the 
kingdom of liberty’ which actually was 
a jump out from the civilization’, and that 
a dictatorship based only on violence is 
not only a contradiction to representa-
tive democracy but also to modern state-
hood’59. It is impossible to deny, although 
it is hard to recognise the constatation of 
Lenin’s hostility towards representative 
democracy as revealing, especially as the 
argument against par excellence ‘demo-
cratic mentality’, himself and commu-
nism at all. Therefore, Leninism is not 
the substantive critique of democracy, 
but the accidental critique of ‘false’ non-
revolutionary democracy60.
2) Far from the unconditional con-
demnation of democracy was also fas-
cism. By the authoritative statement of 
the chief (Duce) himself and the ‘doctor’ 
of fascism, Benito Mussolini, he rejects 
‘the absurd conventional lie about the 
political equality’ and unmasks the ap-
58 V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution, trans. 
F. Luttmer, Accessed March 7, 2015: http://large.
stanford.edu/history/.
59 This is my own translation [B.P.] based 
on S. Žižek, A. Bielik-Robson, A. Walicki, Czy leni-
nowska przemoc zbawi lewicę?, in ‘Europa. Tygod-
nik idei’, 31 III 2007, Nr 13(156), 4.
60 Walicki himself partly confi rms, saying 
that Lenin ‘emphasised direct democracy’ [This is 
my own translation – B.P. – based on:] – ibidem, 3.
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pearance of the power of people in liberal 
democracy, however, it is fascism that is 
‘the purest form of  democracy if the na-
tion be considered as it should be from 
the point of view of quality rather than 
quantity, as an idea, the mightiest be-
cause the most ethical, the most coher-
ent, the truest, expressing itself in a peo-
ple as the conscience and will of the few, 
if not, indeed, of one’61. Although fas-
cism is antiliberal, antidemocratic and 
antisocialist (it should be understood 
as a fi ght with political parties which 
somehow hanged liberalism, democracy 
and socialism on their banners and ap-
propriated them) in its programme and 
work; ‘from beneath the ruins of liberal, 
socialist, and democratic doctrines, fas-
cism extracts those elements which are 
still vital’62.
It should not be forgotten that the 
original programme Fasci di Combatti-
mento (from 1919) was directly ultrad-
emocratic (in a spirit of ‘social’ democ-
racy) not only in phraseology but also 
in concrete postulates. Fascists claimed 
e.g. the establishment of the republic, 
introducing common, equal and direct 
election law for both sexes, abolish-
ing the Senate, noble titles and knight 
orders, liquidating a political police, in-
troducing a mandatory military service 
and uniform, national education sys-
tem, guarantying the freedom of speech, 
conscience, religion, congregations and 
press, parcelling the great ground own-
ership, dissolving equity industrial, 
banking and stock exchange companies, 
estimating and taxing a private property, 
charging the ‘owning classes’ for repay-
ment the state’s debt, introducing eight-
hour workday, lowering retiring age from 
65 to 55 years, switching production to 
61 B. Mussolini, op. cit.
62 Ibidem.
cooperative rules, direct contribution of 
workers in a company income, in foreign 
policy – ‘international solidarity’ within 
League of Nations, abolishing secret di-
plomacy, opposing to any imperialism 
including ‘possible’ Italian imperialism. 
Also after 1943 in Italian Social Republic, 
depended on German occupants, a re-
newed Republican Fascist Party adopted 
a very socially radical programme as-
suming e.g. nationalising companies that 
hire more than one hundred workers, 
parcelling ‘ineffectively used’ grounds 
and transferring it to agricultural coop-
eratives, creating worker councils man-
aging factories, dividing incomes among 
workers in a private sector, introducing 
a detailed economic planning at the gov-
ernment level, increasing a meaning of 
trade unions, democratic electoral sys-
tem, court independence, freedom of 
press, in foreign policy – striving to the 
creation of European Union/Community 
which should also help with emancipa-
tion in Black Africa. Taking to account 
that fascists themselves from Salò, on 
the forefront with a ‘grey eminence’ of 
the regime (a former Lenin’s companion 
and an activist of 3rd Political Interna-
tional), Nicola Bombacci, were interpret-
ing this programme as a return to the 
leftist roots of fascism, it can be assumed 
that leaving these rules after a ‘march on 
Rome’ and at the time of ‘real fascism’ 
was merely a manifestation of action 
opportunism that forces a compromise 
with the forces of non-democratic right-
wing: monarchy, an offi cer corps, social 
elites or the Church.
3) Therefore, the attachment to the 
‘pure’ democratic-nationalistic (in the 
spirit of Rousseau and jacobinistic mili-
tant chauvinism) rule of people’s (nation) 
sovereignty, through which a ‘general 
will’ manifests itself, was exposed in the 
ideology of German, national-socialist 
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Hitlerism even more than in fascism 
sensu proprio (Italian), inheriting – by 
Giovanni Gentile’s political philosophy 
– a specifi c to Italian liberalism the sta-
tolatry of Hegel’s63 origin. In his ‘confes-
sions’, entitled Mein Kampf, a future 3rd 
Reich Führer – manifesting his hatred to 
the dynastic rule and multinational Hab-
sburg’s monarchy and no less obstinate 
and free of hatred of French republicans 
to the ‘cosmopolitan despotism’ of Bour-
bon’s monarchy – was bragging that al-
ready as fi fteen he understood ‘the dis-
tinction between dynastic patriotism and 
völkisch nationalism’64.
Hitlerism was also verbally respect-
ing the national rule (principe des nation-
alés) in the international politics, i.e. the 
self-governance of nations based on eth-
nographic criteria, inseparably connect-
ed with the history of western democracy 
from XIX-th Century national liberation 
movements to ‘14 points’ of president W. 
Wilson. For instance, in the NSDAP pro-
gramme from 1928 a demand to the rise 
of ‘Great Germany’ was articulated (in 
point 1) on the basis of its compatibility 
to the law of nations to self-governance65. 
The equality of rights and duties of all 
state’s citizens (point 9) was also under-
lined there, however, Jews were exclud-
ed from the term of citizenship (point 4) 
and ought to be treated as the ‘guests’ 
of the German state (point 5), i.e. more 
or less as metics in democratic old-Greek 
poleis66.
63 More about the cult of state, common to 
the liberalism and Italian fascism, I write in the 
essay Destra storica. Wielkość I upadek włoskiej 
prawicy liberalnej, in ‘Umierać, ale powoli!’. O mon-
archistycznej i katolickiej kontrrewolucji w krajach 
romańskich 1815–2000, (Cracov 2006), 388–443.
64 A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Unknown 
NSDAP member, ostarapublications.com, p. 24.
65 The 25 Points of Hitler’s Nazi Party, Ac-
cessed March 8, 2015 http://www.historyplace.
com/.
66 Ibidem.
The ‘original’ contribution of na-
tional socialism to the doctrine of peo-
ple’s / nation’s sovereignty was based 
only on transferring that sovereignty to 
a Leader, receiving a democratic legitimi-
sation by the spontaneous acclamatio of 
nation; the national rule, however, was 
transferred from a sum of individuals – 
citizens to homogeneous, racially pure 
group. ‘Overcoming’ both traditional 
particularisms (state, national, dynastic) 
and a demoliberal chaos, the egalitarian 
and compact unity of Reich – People – 
Leader (ein Reich, ein Volk, ein Führer), 
even phraseologically close to the jaco-
binist rule of constitutional Republic, 
‘one and indivisible’ (une et indivisible), 
supposed to be ‘the Germanic democra-
cy, which is a true [underlined by J.B.] 
democracy’67 whose leader expresses vo-
lonté générale of aligned in the German 
Volk’s brotherhood. If to subtract that 
‘adventitious’, particular clarifying Ger-
man, it is the ideal of ‘pure’ Rousseau’s 
democracy.
Analogically to Marxist and Bolshevik 
rhetoric, in Nazi phraseology all accents 
polemic towards democracy are always 
of accidental nature, directed to the par-
ticular kind of democracy, never, howev-
er, to the very rule; they are always ac-
companied by the emphasis of their own 
‘authentic’ democraticness. Young Hitler, 
studying the propagandist literature of 
social democracy quite urgently, was ir-
ritated not by a democratic ideal but the 
party-union’s ‘instruments of terror’ ‘that 
turned democracy into a ridiculous term, 
insulted the ideal of liberty and derided 
that of fraternity with the slogan, ‘If you 
won’t become one of us, we’ll crack your 
skull’’68. The creator of Nazi ideology hated 
67 A. Hitler, op. cit., 106.
68 Ibidem, 62 [It is hard to resist an impres-
sion that seemingly ‘disgusted’ by it ‘student’ later 
surpassed, signifi cantly, ‘masters’ of this method.]
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with all his soul not democracy per se but 
‘real’ democracy – liberal and bourgeois 
which ‘by the introduction of parliamen-
tarianism, (…) produced an abortion of 
‘fi lth and fi re’ (ein Spottgebust aus Dreck 
und Feuer)’69. This, that disposed by such 
‘elegant’ metaphor democracy appears as 
a shabby deception in the service of plu-
tocracy, does not disturb democracy to 
simultaneously be a hatchery of Marxism 
which connects with her a genetic rela-
tionship: ‘Contemporary western democ-
racy is a herald of Marxism, which would 
not arise without democracy’70. A con-
tradiction here is apparent because both 
plutocracy and Marxism have in essence 
one and the very same face of a Jew. But 
discovery made by a socialist and a na-
tional democrat, that ‘Jewish social de-
mocracy’ fi ghts ‘against nation’s econo-
my’ and its ‘objective was the destruction 
of the national economic system and the 
establishment of international capitalistic 
domination in its stead’71, does not incline 
him to drop social warranties of democra-
cy but, conversely: studying social issues 
reveals to him a ‘new and fascinating 
world’, strengthens his conviction that 
a ‘bourgeois took a defi nite stand against 
even the most legitimate human demands 
of the working classes’ and fi nally leads 
to conclusion that ‘so long as there are 
employers who lack social understanding’ 
[we will never be – B.P.] ‘conscious of (…) 
[our – B.P.] duty as members of the na-
tional community’72. True German social 
democracy does not count on a ‘brother-
hood of bourgeois politicians’ protecting 
only selfi sh class interests, but on ‘pro-
letarian masses, goaded to extremity and 





73 Ibidem,  456.
At the end we put and try to answer 
an ‘indecent’ question: why – so surely 
and imperiously entrenched in the for-
tresses of liberal democracy (which is 
presented by them as an order with no 
real alternatives) – the representatives 
of democratic mainstream delight in re-
calling and publicising allegedly still 
deadly dangerous ‘threat to democracy’ 
of ‘fascism’ although they know that this 
‘threat’ is in fact a ‘paper tiger’? On the 
other hand, why do they equally conse-
quently ignore the critique of democracy 
from the side of ‘substantivists’? Why the 
fi gure of – if not ‘absolute’ then in any 
case – repugnant evil of antidemocratism 
is not Plato but Hitler (anyway constant-
ly replicating himself; in the last decades 
the count of ‘second Hitlers’ would be 
the task overwhelming to the strengths 
of even the most patient scientist)?
There is no need so the answer to the 
above question was exceptionally subtle. 
That is because in such way the iden-
tifi ed enemy of democracy is extremely 
convenient due to the obvious theoreti-
cal nothingness or even a mumbling 
of the doctrines of fascism and Nazism 
and moreover due to the systems of ma-
lefi cent and genocidal stigma that arose 
from them. Also a demonstration of the 
superfi ciality of fascist or national-social-
ist ‘democracy’ does not cause any prob-
lem especially when democracy a priori is 
identifi ed with liberty, ‘respect to human 
dignity’, justice or law stability. Howev-
er, a confrontation with the arguments 
of ‘substantivists’ would force democrats 
to a major, philosophical debate which 
could demonstrate a theoretical and on-
tological nothingness of the basis of peo-
ple’s rule; therefore, it would be a real 
threat to the reign of demoliberal estab-
lishment. Fortunately, from the point 
of view of the defenders of democracy, 
studying the ancient classicists of politi-
cal philosophy lets itself to be treated as 
a harmless toy of scholars; and XIX-th 
or XX-th Century reactionists could be 
played deaf, because their ideals were 
successfully confined to ‘niche’ areas, 
without a bigger concern that they can 
emerge to the wider surface. As long as 
democracy feels steady and without real 
alternatives, it can disregard Socrates 
trying to sting it in the neck. Only in the 
case of a sudden change of conjuncture 
the argument of hemlock has to be used.
